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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is based upon UCA §78-2-2 which grants the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from judgments of any court of record over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. This appeal was
transferred to the Court of Appeals by direction of the Supreme Court. Notice of this transfer
was given to the parties by an order dated the 24th day of April, 2000.
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

B.

The Issues Presented on Appeal:
1.

Whether the Trial Court properly computed the Plaintiffs damages and
whether the damages were trebled as required by UCA §38-9-1 and 3?

2.

Whether the Plaintiff s money damages are limited to statutory damages in the
sum of $1,000.00?

3.

The failure to award prejudgment interest on the damage claim.

4.

Whether the award of attorney's fees under the written Findings of Fact as
entered by the court should not have been less than $27,576.00?

5.

Whether the Trial Court properly applied the law when considering the nature
of the legal services and the amount of time spent in the case to date?

6.

Whether the Trial Court, as a matter of law, improperly reduced by two-thirds
(%) the amount of attorney's fees to be recovered in the case?

7.

Whether the Trial Court entered sufficient Findings of Fact in order to reduce
the award of attorney's fees from the amount claimed by the Plaintiff?

The Standard of Review on Appeal:
1.

The court reviews issues of law under the correction of error standard.

2.

The court reviews the ultimate application of law to any proven set of facts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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under the correction of error standard.
3.

The court reviews disputed evidence and the resulting Findings of Fact under
the clearly erroneous standard.

4.

In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the reviewing court will presume that
the discretion of the trial is properly exercised unless the record clearly
indicates the contrary. Beverly Goddard v. Grant A. Hickman 685 P.2d 530
(Utah 1984); Thomas J. Donnahue v. Intermountain Health Care 748 P.2d
1067 (Utah 1988).

5.

A Trial Court will be deemed to have abused its discretion where it awards less
than the amount of attorney fees requested when there is adequate and
uncontroverted evidence in the record to support the nature and the amount of
fees claimed, unless the Trial Court specifically offers an appropriate
explanation for the reduction in the fee. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v.
Roland W. Reichert 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989): Stephen Martindale v.
Tom Adams 777 P.2d 514 (Utah App. 1989); Dixie State Bank v. Kirk
Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).

IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutory Provisions:
1.

UCA §15-1-1, Interest Rates - Contracted Rate - Legal Rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is subject of their
contract.

^

(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action shall be 10% per annum. (Emphasis added.)
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way affect any penalty or
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or
obligations made before May 14, 1981.
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2.

UCA §3 8-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien.
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real
property, who causes or has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or
filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the
document is forged, groundless, or contains a material misstatement of false claim,
is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages,
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as provided in this
chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such document of record within
20 days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of
the real property. This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or
materialmen's liens. (Emphasis added).

3.

UCA §38-9-3, Liability of Person Refusing to Correct Document Containing
Wrongful Lien - Penalty - Misdemeanor.
A person described in Section 38-9-1, who willfully refuses to release or
correct the document of record within 20 days from the date of written request from
the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property:
(1) is liable to the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property for the
sum of not less than $1,000, or for treble the actual damages caused by the
recording or filing, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and
costs of the action; and [Balance of the statute outlined]. (Emphasis added).

4.

UCA §38-9-4, Action may be Brought in District Court - Costs and Attorneys
Fees.
The owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property may bring an action
under this chapter in the district court of the county in which the real property is
located for such relief as is required to immediately clear title to the real property or
may join that action with an action for damages as described in this chapter, after
giving the notice required in Section 38-9-1. In either case, the owner or beneficial
title-holder may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action if he prevails.
(Emphasis added).
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case.
This is a second appeal of a dispute involving the filing of a naked "Lis Pendens".

The present appeal involves the proper computation of the amount of damages and the
reduction by two-thirds (%) from the amount of attorney's fees otherwise found by the court
to be reasonable. The Trial Court failed to award any prejudgment interest to the Plaintiff
on the statutory cause of action.
In the prior appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Lis Pendens filed by the
Defendant was both invalid and groundless as a matter of law. David Winters v. Joanne
Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App.). A review by the Utah
Supreme Court of the ruling of the Court of Appeals was sought by the Defendant, but was
denied. The case was then remanded to the Trial Court for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of damages, statutory damages, and the amount of recoverable attorney's fees.
B.
?v

The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The trial on the issues of damages, statutory damages, and recoverable attorney's fees

was conducted before Judge William Thorne on December 13th, 1999. The District Court
concluded that the Plaintiff suffered no money damages whatsoever. (Findings of Fact ^f 17;
Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9). The Court ultimately determined that $1,000.00 in
statutory damages was all that could be recovered by the Plaintiff. (Trial Transcript p. 116;
Findings of Fact 1J10; Record pp. 560 to 564; Addendum No. 3, pp. 9 and 10).
The District Court found that a reasonable attorney's fees in the case wras $27,576.00,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but then proceeded to reduce the fee award by two-thirds (%). (Trial Transcript pp. 115 to
.121; Finding of Fact 1J20A; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
The District Court did award $2,090.00 in litigation costs relating to the removal of
the Lis Pendens in the California Superior Court proceedings. (Trial Transcript p. 116;
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 6; Addendum No. 13, pp. 69 to 78). The District Court did not
treat these out-of-pocket costs as "damages" under the statute and as a result, they were not
trebled and no prejudgment interest was assessed on these amounts.
C.

Statement of the Core Facts.
For purpose of the present appeal, the following core facts were proven at trial or is

part of the trial record before the Third District Court:
1.

Pursuant to the remand of the Court of Appals, the District Court conducted

an evidentiary trial on December 13, 1999, on the issue of the damages, statutory damages,
interest, and the claim for statutory attorney's fees.
2.

In May of 1995, Mr. Schulman, as a duly licensed California attorney, filed a

naked Lis Pendens on the Plaintiffs home located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
(Findings of Fact ^[5; Record p. 561; Addendum No. 3, p. 8; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 2;
Record pp. 14 to 15; Addendum No. 9, pp. 62 to 64).
3.

The recorded Lis Pendens was never voluntarily released. The Lis Pendens

was eventually ordered to be released pursuant to an Order of the California Superior Court
as part of the post-divorce proceedings which were being conducted (but not concluded) on
April 19, 1996. This domestic law proceeding involved a monetary dispute that had arisen
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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between the divorced parties as to the amount of liabilities that may have been owed under
the 1989 California Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact f7; Record p. 561; Addendum No.
3, p. 8).
4.

David Winters, as a Plaintiff, filed this statutory action against the Defendant

in the Third District Court in Salt Lake County in December of 1995. The Complaint
asserted claims of negligence, abuse of legal process, and a quiet title action which included
the wrongful lien claim set forth in UCA §38-9-1. (Findings of Fact ^[8; Record p. 561;
Addendum No. 3, p. 8, and No. 14, p. 13).
5.

David Winters made a claim for $ 1,000.00 in statutory damages as part of his

original Complaint in the Third District Court. (Findings of Fact ^[10; Record p. 562;
Addendum No. 3, p. 9, No. 14, p. 13).
6.

The Plaintiff, David Winters, eventually filed a Motion under Rules 12,54,55,

and 56 to establish the Defendant's statutory liability under the statutory cause of action. In
response, the Defendant moved for Summary Judgment with respect to its asserted defenses
and sought the dismissal of the entire Complaint. (Trial Transcript pp. 56 to 57; Record pp.
51 to 54, 316 to 318; Addendum No. 5, pp. 30 to 33).
7.

The Plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of his other causes of actions, if the Third

District Court granted the relief authorized to be entered pursuant to the wrongful lien claim
contained in UCA §38-9-1. (Trial Transcript p. 57).
8.

David Winters had already incurred $3,500.00 in attorney's fees up to the point

in time in which the California Superior Court ordered the Lis Pendens to be released.
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(Findings of Fact ^[9; Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9).
9.

The Third District Court ultimately concluded that reasonable attorney' s fees

necessarily incurred to recover the $1,000.00 in statutory damages was limited to $2,000.00
which represents a substantial reduction in the actual fee claim. The District Court justified
the reduced fee amount in part due to the complexity of the case caused by the other two (2)
cause of actions. ( Trial Transcript p. 116; Findings of Fact ^fljl1 and 20A; Record p. 562;
Addendum No. 3, pp. 9 and 10).
10.

The District Court further determined that reasonable attorney's fees, as a result

of the original appeal of the dismissal of the wrongful lien claim, was limited to $2,500.00.
(Trial Transcript p. 116; Findings of Fact ^|12; Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9).
11.

The District Court found that the facts and the legal theories of the claims

contained in the Plaintiff s Complaint overlapped, but were not intertwined. (Trial Transcript
pp. 116 to 117; Findings of Fact ^|13; Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9).
12.

The District Court found that David Winters paid and incurred certain legal

fees which were charged by his California divorce lawyer, Jonathan Gordon, and which
related to the release of the Lis Pendens. (Trial Transcript pp. 4 to 5; Finding of Fact ^|14;
Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 5; Addendum No. 12, p.
68).
13.

The Plaintiff sought and was awarded the sum of $1,650.00 for the legal fees

actually paid to Mr. Gordon. (Trial Transcript pp. 7 and 116; Findings of Fact f 14; Record
p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9).
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14.

The District Court found that David Winters had paid and incurred a total of

$2,090.82 in reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with the California Superior
Court proceeding. These legal fees and costs were directly related to the release of the Lis
Pendens. (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 117; Findings of Fact ^[14; Record p. 562; Addendum
No. 3, p. 9; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits Nos. 5 and 6; Addendum Nos. 12, p. 68, and 13, pp. 69
to 78). [However, these out-of-pocket costs were not treated as "damages" by the Trial
Court.]
15.

The District Court further found that the Plaintiff had incurred additional out-

of-pocket costs in connection with the California Superior Court proceedings, as it relates
to the Lis Pendens, in the sum of $150.00. (Trial Transcript p. 117).
16.

The District Court did not find that the Plaintiff had proven any emotional

distress damages and accordingly awarded no monetary damages relating to this part of the
damage claim. (Trial Transcript p. 117; Findings of Fact ^f 18; Record p. 562; Addendum No.
3,p.9).
17.

The District Court ultimately concluded that David Winters is entitled to no

more than $1,000.00 in statutory damages pursuant to UCA §38-9-1. (Conclusions of Law
Tfl; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
18.

The Plaintiff suffered economic damages in the form of lost interest on his

money in the sum of $2,015.67. (Trial Transcript pp. 7 to 8; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 7;
Addendum No. 14, pp. 79 to 85).
19.

The District Court specifically found that the hourly rate charged by the
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Plaintiff was reasonable. (Trial Transcript p. 118).
20.

The District Court ultimately found that a reasonable attorney's fees was in the

sum of $27,576.00, but the total fee claim was subject to reduction for various
"complicating" matters including the assertion of other cause of actions. (Finding of Fact
Tf20A; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
21.

The District Court concluded that the attorney negligence claim complicated

the action and prevented a resolution of the case short of Summary Judgment and appeal.
(Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 117; Findings of Fact TJ20D; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3,
p. 10). [There was no evidence presented by the Defendant at the time of the trial relating
to this claim of "complicated" trial issues.]
22.

The District Court concluded that the legal fees could be divided categorically

according to the different cause of actions. (Trial Transcript pp. 118 to 119; Findings of Fact
ffi[13 and 20D; Record pp. 562 and 563; Addendum No. 3, pp. 9 and 10; Record pp. 467 to
479; Addendum No. 6, pp. 34 to 36; Supplemental Attorney Fee Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 12, Addendum No. 7, pp. 47 to 58).
23.

A current detailed attorney's fee affidavit was submitted by the Plaintiffs

attorney of record and it was accepted by the parties and the court for what it contained.
(Trial Transcript p. 49; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, p. 47).
24.

David Winter's total attorney' s fees relating to the Utah case that were incurred

up through December 10, 1999, was in the sum of $35,840.25. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to
50).
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25.

David winter's incurred an additional ten (10) hours of time thereafter and

including the actual trial (Trial Transcript p. 50).
26.

The amount of the Utah attorney's fees that relate to the cause of actions for

which recovery of professional fees cannot be obtained was eliminated from the total fee
claim at the time of the trial. (Trial Transcript pp. 50 to 51; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 8;
Addendum No. 15, p. 86).
27.

The total amount of attorney's fees claimed which relate in whole or in part to

the Lis Pendens' litigation (and taking into account the excluded charges) was in the sum of
$32,419.00 up through December 10, 1999. (Trial Transcript p. 51).
28.

The Plaintiffs claim, under UCA §38-9-1 and 4, includes two (2) basic

elements which are: (i) the release of the Lis Pendens; and (ii) a separate claim for damages
or statutory damages. (Trial Transcript p. 52).
29.

Once the Lis Pendens was released, the Plaintiff continued to pursue his claim

for money damages or statutory damages. (Trial Transcript p. 52).
30.

The litigation was only reluctantly undertaken and only after several months

was allowed to elapse before the Motion to impose statutory7 liability was filed in order to see
if a claim to the title or the physical possession of the home was made in the California
Superior Court proceedings. (Trial Transcript pp. 53 to 55, 65; Record pp. 467 to 479;
Addendum No. 6, pp. 34 to 46; Supplemental Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12;
Addendum No. 7, pp. 47 to 58). [This Motion to impose liability was filed under Rules 12,
45, 55, and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.]
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31.

No offer of a money judgment in any amount was ever tendered by the

Defendant in this case. (Trial Transcript p. 58).
32.

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under Rules 12,54,55, and 56 was

filed by the Plaintiff in order to establish liability and to fix statutory liability in the sum of
$1,000.00 at the very least. (Trial Transcript p. 62; Record pp. 51 to 54; Addendum No. 5,
pp. 30 to 33). [See prayer for relief at Record pp. 53 to 54.]
33.

The bulk of the cause of the action related primarily to obtaining a release of

the Lis Pendens and related damages or statutory damages. (Trial Transcript pp. 74 to 75,
and 78 to 79).
34.

The statutory cause of action was the principle case which was asserted and all

of the other legal claims would be waived, if the Lis Pendens was released and the statutory
damage compensation was tendered. (Trial Transcript pp. 57, 78 to 79).
35.

All work specifically relating to the abuse of process and negligence claims

were eliminated from the attorney's fee claim. (Trial Transcript pp. 50 to 51, 80 to 82;
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 8; Addendum No. 15, p. 86).
36.

The Plaintiff would have been required to proceed with the statutory cause of

action whether or not the California Superior Court ordered the Lis Pendens released. (Trial
Transcript pp. 65, 82 to 83).
37.

The Plaintiffs Motion filed under Rules 12,54,55, and 56 in the Third District

Court went beyond the initial limited relief granted by the California Superior Court. (Trial
Transcript pp. 52 and 86; Record pp. 51 to 54; Addendum No. 5, p. 30 to 33).
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VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Plaintiff has proven out-of-pocket damages of not less than $4,797.64

which must, by law, be trebled pursuant to the provisions of UCA §38-9-3. The Plaintiffs
proven damages consists of:
A.

California Lis Pendens litigation costs in the sum of $2,090.82. (Trial
Transcript p. 117).

B.

California travel and telephone costs prior to April 12,1996, in the sum
of$395.07. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10; Addendum No. 16,pp.87
to 100). (This is 50% of the total listed expenses).

C.

California travel and telephone costs after April 12,1996, in the sum of
$298.08. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 11; Addendum No. 17, pp. 101
to 105). (This is 50% of the total listed expenses).

D.

Lost interest on expended funds in the sum of $2,013.67. (Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibit No. 7; Addendum No. 14, pp. 79 to 85).

2.

The District Court failed to award prejudgment interest on the proven damages.

3.

The District Court failed to award an adequate judgment for proven attorney's

*m^.- fees. The amount that should have been awarded is $32,419.00.
4.

The District Court, as a matter of law, improperly reduced the proven amount

of the attorney's fee claim by two-thirds (%) representing the supposed legal costs relating
to the two (2) other cause of actions. Proper factual and legal reasons for the reduction is not
stated in the record and the actual reason given by the District Court is not supported by the
evidence and is contrary to the governing case law.
5.

The District Court committed error, as a matter of law, when it failed to award

the full amount of attorney's fees demanded, because there was no competent evidence to
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counter the testimony and the evidence as to reasonableness of the actual work performed
on a daily basis, the necessity of the same, and the professional rate charged for each service.
6.

The cost of the legal representation associated with pursuing any related legal

theories (and which are based upon the same core set of facts) are recoverable by the
prevailing party as a matter of law.
VII. ARGUMENT
The Incontroverted Testimony of Competent and
Knowledgeable Witnesses must be Accepted as True
Absent Specific Findings or Evidence to the Contrary.
It is a generally accepted rule of law that when a witness testifies (or provides
evidence) as to any fact and the testimony of the witness is not discredited by other
competent evidence, and where the testimony itself is not improbable, then the testimony of
the witness is to be accepted as true by the court or the fact finder. This rule of law is
particularly important in a case where the testimony of the witness is fully corroborated by
the other evidence as it was in this case. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence §1083; 81 Am.Jur.2d
Witnesses §660; West v. Sinclair 90 F.Supp. 307 (DC WD Mo. 1950); Wichita Terminal
Elevator v. Commissioner 47-2 USTC ^9253.162F.2d513 (CA-10 1947). The Court in the
West v. Sinclair case stated the rule of law as follows:
"It is the duty of the Court and the jury in every case to view the testimony
upon the theory that the witnesses are telling the truth."
The major issues before this court on appeal are the correct legal conclusions to be
drawn from the undisputed core facts. In this case, the court need only apply the law to a
known set of facts. First National Bank v. Commissioner 91-1 USTC Tf50,005, 921 F.2d
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1

1081 (CA-10 1990); John R. Pollei v. Commissioner 89-1 USTC ^9389. 877 F.2d 838 (CA10 1989). There are only a few truly disputed facts in this case.
The Trial Court Committed Error When it
Failed to Award and Treble the Proven
Damages of the Plaintiff.
The District Court found that the Plaintiff suffered no damages. (Findings of Fact
^[17; Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9). Notwithstanding this written finding, the Trial
Court awarded compensation to the Plaintiff as damages in the case. (Trial Transcript p.
117). It is clear in the record that the District Court attempted to justify its ultimate ruling
regarding damages and attorney's fees under two (2) alternative computational methods.
(Trial Transcript pp. 115 to 121).
The District Court failed to award the Plaintiff the full amount of his proven damages
and to treble them as required by law. As a matter of law, certain damages (or out-of-pocket
costs) will necessarily exist when a person files a "naked" Lis Pendens from a foreign
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs proven damages were as follows:
NO.

! 1

i

ITEM OR DESCRIPTION

The Plaintiffs Billing
Charge of J. Gordon, Esq.
(Legal fees paid to the
California lawyer as it
relates to the removal of the
Lis Pendens.) (Trial
Transcript pp. 116 and 117).

TOTAL
AMOUNT
CLAIMED

$1,650.00

TRIAL
EXHIBIT
NUMBER

Plaintiffs
Trial
Exhibit
No. 5

ADDENDUM
NUMBER

DISTRICT
COURT
RULING

No. 12

Allowed
by the
Trial
Court
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NO.

ITEM OR DESCRIPTION

2

The Plaintiffs Out-ofPocket Costs for attending
the Lis Pendens litigation in
California. (Trial Transcript
pp. 116 and 117).

$440.82

3

The Plaintiffs lost interest
on cash payments made to
the attorney (i.e. the accrual
of the interest). (Trial
Transcript pp. 7 and 8).

$2,013.67

The Plaintiffs Out-ofPocket Travel and
Telephone Costs incurred
prior to April 12, 1996 (onehalf (!/2) of $790.15). (Trial
Transcript pp. 8 and 9).

$395.07

The Plaintiffs Out-ofPocket Travel and
Telephone Costs incurred
between April 13, 1996 to
June 2, 1996 (one-half QA)
of 596.16). (Trial
Transcript pp. 9 and 10).

$298.08

4

1

5

TOTAL

TOTAL
AMOUNT
CLAIMED

TRIAL
EXHIBIT
NUMBER

ADDENDUM
NUMBER

DISTRICT
COURT
RULING

Plaintiffs
Trial
Exhibit
No. 6

No. 13

Allowed
by the
Trial
Court

Plaintiffs
Trial
Exhibit
No. 7

No. 14

Not

Plaintiffs
Trial
Exhibit
No. 10

No. 16

Plaintiffs
Trial
Exhibit
No. 11

No. 17

1

allowed

Not

1

allowed

Not
allowed

$4,797.64

NOTE: The Lis Pendens was not released until late May, 1996, though
it was ordered to be released in mid April, 1996.

The amount of the Plaintiffs proven damages are to be trebled. UCA §38-9-3. If,
after trebling, the proven damages exceed $1,000.00, then the actual damages is the correct
damage claim to be awarded by the Trial Court. If the trebled damages are less than
$1,000.00, then the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the statutory sum of $1,000.00 in lieu of
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his actual damages. UCA §38-9-1 and 3. As a matter of law, the Trial Court failed to follow
this damage procedure and such is omitted from the written Findings of Fact. (See also Trial
Transcript pp. 115 to 120).
The Defendant knew that her actions would result in separate trial proceedings being
instituted in two (2) different states. (Trial Transcript p. 56). This fact was not rebutted by
other evidence or testimony. The Plaintiff claimed at trial that his out-of-pocket costs for the
California Superior Court litigation should be apportioned between the two (2) different state
court actions. (Trial Transcript pp. 7 to 10). Part of the litigations costs in the California
Superior Court are attributable to the release of the Lis Pendens. The District Court
acknowledged this fact by awarding compensation to the Plaintiff for activities relating to
the Lis Pendens in the California Superior Court. (Trial Transcript pp. 116 and 117). These
out-of-pocket costs relating to the California Superior Court proceedings totaled at least
$446.82 excluding any amount for California attorney's fees. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits Nos.
6, 10, and 11; Addendum Nos. 13, 16, and 17). This amount includes the $150.00 actually
awarded by the District Court for a portion of these types of costs. (Trial Transcript pp. 116
and 117). These actual damages or out-of-pocket costs should have been trebled. UCA §389-3. This would result in an award of $14,392.92 after being trebled. Even if damages are
limited to just $446.82, this amount when trebled is $1,340.46.
With respect to actual damages, the above table of damages were factually proven.
There was no specific evidence presented to contradict the amount of the claim or the
reasonableness of the allocation of the costs as between the two (2) separate proceedings.
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The only real contest is the application of law to these facts. As a matter of law, these types
of out-of-pocket costs are recoverable in a case such as this. With the exception of $150.00
and $2,090.82, the Trial Court failed to award the proven damages. (Trial Transcript pp. 115
to 119). The Trial Court thereafter failed to apply the statute correctly by trebling the actual
damages. The Trial Court's ultimate conclusion that no damages were suffered is erroneous
and contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
The proving of a fact in a given case initially rests with the fact finder. However,
where the facts are not materially contested, then they are deemed "proven" or established
in a case. The existence of a proven fact in a case will not be changed on an appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. However, the application of statutory law, against a backdrop of
proven facts is a matter of law and is properly reviewed on a de novo basis. The application
of statutory law to a proven set of facts is the ultimate legal conclusion to be drawn by the
Trial Court.
The Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award
of Prejudgment Interest at the Statutory Rate.
The right to collect interest under the laws of the state of Utah is governed in part by
state statute and in part by the common law. The controlling Utah statute is UCA §15-1-1
et. seq. The text of this important statute reads as follows:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is
subject of their contract. (Emphasis added).
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
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(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to
any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981."
Based on this statute the obligated party must pay prejudgment interest on the proven
damages. Once a judgment has been entered, the rate of interest on the judgment, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, is set at a variable rate.
The Utah Supreme Court has set down specific guidelines in allowing prejudgment
interest on a claim for money damages or the detention of money. These guidelines or
common law rules are as follows:
"Where the damage is complete and the amount of loss fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the judgment. On
the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful death,
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in such
cases prejudgment interest is not allowed."
Harold O. Biork v. April Industries. Inc. 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977), cert, denied 431 US 930:
Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co. 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976) (citing Fell v. Union
Pac. Rv. Co. 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907)); Canyon Country Store v. Norton E.
Bracey 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be ascertained
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or
jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than being guided by their best judgment in
assessing the amount to be allowed for past, as well as for future injury. Price-Orem Inv. Co.
v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989). In the present case, these
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amounts are both fixed and certain.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled nearly 100 years ago that Trial Court must award prejudgment interest in cases where the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of
the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Neil Jorgensen v. John Clay &
Company 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); Gary T. Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978); Wheatley v. Oregon Short 49 Ut. 105,162 P. 86 (Utah
1916); Gillespie v. Blood 81 Ut. 306,17 P.2d 822 (Utah 1932); Railroad v. Board 35 Ut. 13,
99 P. 263 (Utah 1909).
The Utah Supreme Court has, in the 1800 landmark case of Wasatch Mining Co. v.
Crescent Mining Co. 7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586 (1890), affirmed 151 US 317, 14 S.Ct. 348, 38
L.Ed. 177 (1894), stated the rule of law as to prejudgment interest as follows:
"In Utah, interest is allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of statute or
contract providing therefore".
This would be set at the minimum rate of 10% per annum under present statutory law.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that interest is a proper measure of damages in
cases involving the detention of (or the failure to pay) money. J. B. Walker v. Rocky
Mountain Recreation Corporation 22 Utah.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). In the J. B.
Walker case, the Court stated that in the absence of a liquidated damage clause, a proper
measure of damage for the detention of money is the recovery of interest. J. B. Walker v.
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation 22 Utah.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973).
This rule of law has also been followed in other jurisdictions. In Porter E. Wilkinson
v.Eugene M.Smith 639 P.2d 768 (Wash. App. 1982), the Washington Court of Appeals held
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that the proper rate of interest of the difference between the statutory rate and the rate
required to be paid by the Plaintiff. In the Wilkinson case, the Plaintiff was able to recover,
as part of his consequential damages, the interest he had paid on money he had borrowed to
acquire the real property. Porter E. Wilkinson v. Eugene M. Smith 639 P.2d 768 (Wash.
App. 1982). In United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Company 681 P.2d 390
(Ariz. App. 1983), the Arizona Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the
"traditional measure of damages for breach of contract to loan money is additional interest
required for a replacement loan".
The Trial Court should have allowed interest on the proven damages at the statutory
rate of 10%. The cause of action, at least as to the $1,000.00 statutory minimum amount,
accrued after the twenty (20) day period expired. Interest should run from the point in time
the damage was incurred.
The Party Making a Claim for Attorney's Fees
has the Burden of Proof to Establish the Right
to the Award and the Amount of the Award.
The party requesting an award of attorney's fees has the burden of presenting
evidence sufficient to support the amount of the award and the legal right to such an award.
Robert Kurthv. Daniel R.Wiarda 1999 Utah Ct.App. 153,981 P.2d 417 (Utah App.); David
L. Salmon v. Davis County 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996).
In this case, the prior ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals establishes the Plaintiffs
statutory right to the award. The remand to the District Court was to determine only two (2)
items: (i) the amount of any monetary damage recoverable under the statute, and (ii) the
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amount of recoverable attorney's fees.
The Reasonableness of the Attorney's Fees Can Be
Proven and Justified in a Number of Recognized Ways.
The Trial Court is only required to award a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in
a case. The reasonableness of the fees can be shown or proven in a number of recognized
ways. There is no single method that must be followed in order to establish the amount and
reasonableness of the attorney's fees incurred. The following methods have been approved
by the courts in prior cases:
1.

The submission of an attorney's fee affidavit outlining the legal services, the
amount of time spent on each task, and fees actually charged. Dejavue Inc. v.
US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355. 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.). This
was done in this case twice. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to 58; Record pp. 467 to
479; Addendum No. 6, p. 34 to 46; Supplemental Affidavit, Plaintiffs' Trial
Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, pp. 47 to 58).

2.

The submission of detailed client monthly billings records outlining the fees
and costs actually charged on a daily basis in the case. Dejavue Inc. v. US
Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.). This was
done in this case. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 9).

3.

Expert testimony of a local attorney substantiating the reasonableness of the
fees in the case. Dejavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355,
993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul
Jewkes 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984). This was done in this case through the
testimony of W. Kevin Jackson, Esq. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to 58).

4.

An evidentiary hearing in which actual testimony is taken by the Trial Court.
David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218
(Utah App.); Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul Jewkes 701
P.2d 486 (Utah 1984). This was done in this case. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to
86).

5.

Any evidence which bears on the nature and the amount of time spent in
representing the client is admissible. This was done in this case. (Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9; Addendum Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 15).
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6.

A combination of any of the above methods.

The party against whom the evidence is offered must do more than contend against
it. The defending party has, at the very least, the duty to go forward with some meaningful
evidence to show that all or a specific portion of the fees are in fact unreasonable. A mere
generalized claim that the fees were "unnecessary", "excessive", or "inappropriate" must be
supported by identifiable evidence. The Defendant did not challenge, and in fact conceded,
the nature of the legal work that was rendered in this case and the amount of time spent on
any given task on a given day. (Trial Transcript p. 49, line 18).
In the present case, the Plaintiff "backed out" of the gross fee claim all time charges
that were not related in some material way to the statutory cause of action. (Trial Transcript
pp. 50 to 52; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 8; Addendum No. 15, p. 86). This excluded sum
of money totaled $3,421.25. This should have been a relatively small figure because the
other two (2) common law claims were not subject to any meaningful discovery, were not
part of the Plaintiffs original motion to impose statutory liability, and did not result in a trial
on the merits.
In this case, there is no expert testimony offered by the Defendant which tends to
show that: (i) the hourly rate claimed, (ii) the charges actually incurred, (iii) the hours spent,
or (iv) the work specifically performed was either excessive, unnecessary, or represented the
"churning" of the file. (Trial Transcript p. 49). The Defendant's testimony as to the amount
her attorney's fees or legal costs does not shed much light on the Plaintiffs actual legal costs
in this case. (Trial Transcript p. 98). For example, the Plaintiff, having the burden of proof,
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would be expected to exceed the Defendant's actual time charges. The Defendant testified
that her total legal fees to date were at least $14,290.00. (Trial Transcript p. 98).
All of the Defendant's allegations that the fees were not legally necessary because a
similar claim was also being made in the California Superior Court case fails to recognize
that the removal of the Lis Pendens is only a portion of the present case. (Trial Transcript
pp. 52,56, 58, and 62). The eventual removal of the Lis Pendens (either by voluntary action
or by reason of a judicial order) did not and could not terminate the statutory cause of action.
There was additional relief that was specifically authorized by the statute and which was
being sought by the Plaintiff in the Complaint and at the time of the trial. (Trial Transcript
pp. 62 to 65; Findings of Fact TfiJIO* 11, and 12; Record p. 562; Addendum No. 3, p. 9).
Since the additional statutory relief (i.e. damages and at least some amount of
attorney's fees) was never tendered by the Defendant, the case had to move forward on these
two (2) issues. (Trial Transcript pp. 57,58,62 to 63,65, and 86). This meant that more legal
fees would be incurred by the Plaintiff. (Trial Transcript pp. 78 to 79, 82 to 85).
The Defendant, at the time of the trial, claimed that the legal fees were unnecessary
and unreasonable for the following legal reasons:
1.

The Lis Pendens was released as a result of the exclusive efforts of Jonathan
Gordon (i.e. David Winters' California lawyer). (Trial Transcript p. 108).

2.

The only legal fees necessarily relating to the removal of the Lis Pendens was
in the sum of $1,650.00. (Trial Transcript pp. 111 to 113). [This represents
the legal fees paid to the California lawyer for the Superior Court
proceedings.]

These defenses are deficient for a number of reasons. The statute clearly authorizes
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the Plaintiff to recover attorney's fees if they are incurred in seeking actual or statutory
damages. The Defendant raises the above listed legal defenses to the right to claim
attorney's fee even though the only concession concerning the amount of the Plaintiffs
recoverable damages was made during closing argument. (Trial Transcript p. 108). The
legal cost in seeking damages are by statute recoverable by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff made
out a prima facia case for attorney's fees of not less than $32,419.00. (Trial Transcript p.
51). The gross amount found to be reasonable by the District Court was $27,576.00.
(Findings of Fact TJ20A; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
The Recovery of Attorney Fees
Requires Satisfaction of Certain
Work Product Conditions and the Entry
of Specific Findings of Fact.
In Utah, the award of reasonable attorney fees to a party may only be granted if it is
specifically authorized by state or federal statute or by the terms of a valid contract provision.
Kip Quinn v. Fenton Quinn 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992); Canyon Country Store v.
Norton E. Bracev 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc. 645 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990); Lynda Baldwin v. Max D. Burton 850
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993); Harriet W. Blake v. Earnest E. Blake 17 Ut.2d 369, 412 P.2d 454
(Utah 1966).
Regardless of whether the basis for an award of attorney fees is contractual or
statutory, the courts have long held that only a reasonable fee may be recovered by the
prevailing party. Kip Quinn v. Fenton Quinn 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992); Canyon
Country Store v. Norton E. Bracev 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989): Jensen v. Lichtenstein 45 Ut.
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320, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1914).
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee is largely a matter
within the Trial Court's sound discretion. Kip Quinn v. Fenton Ouinn 830 P.2d 282 (Utah
App. 1992); Ronald P. Jenkins v. Ronald L. Bailey 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984); H. LeRov
Cobabe v. B. Glen Crawford 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989). It has been declared that this
discretion is not open-ended. In order to foster consistent and equitable fee awards by Trial
Courts, the Utah Supreme Court, in the lead case of Dixie State Bank, outlined some
"practical guidelines" for analyzing the reasonableness of attorney fees by adopting a five (5)
point review procedure. Dixie State Bank v. Kirk Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
Under the Dixie State Bank ruling, a Trial Court should engage in a multi-step process
which involves the following basic steps:
First, it must begin the fee analysis by determining exactly what legal
work the requesting the attorney actually performed, both in terms of the
nature of the legal work performed and the time spent in it's performance.
[These facts were conceded by the Defendant. (Trial Transcript p. 49).]
Second, the court must then consider how much of that work was
reasonably necessary to adequately or properly conclude the matter for which
the legal representation was sought. [No specific Findings ofFact were entered
regarding this process.]
Third, The requesting attorney's billing rate should be compared with
those customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services to insure the
reasonableness of the fee claim. [This was conceded by the Defendant. (Trial
Transcript p. 49) and also approved by the court (Trial Transcript p. 118).]
Fourth, the trial court can then establish a preliminary fee by
multiplying the number of necessary hours of legal work actually performed
by the appropriate hourly rate. [This was done via. Findings of Fact TJ20A.]
The final step in the process involves the consideration of the various
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factors set forth in the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility DR-2-106
which is now set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and specifically Rule 1.5 of the Code, the
following elements or factors are to be considered by the Court when making a fee
determination:
1.

The novelty and the complexity of the case and the legal issues involved;

2.

The likelihood that the representation will preclude the lawyer from accepting
other employment;

3.

The actual experience, the expertise, and the reputation of the lawyer;

4.

The amount of money involved and the results if any obtained;

5.

The time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;

6.

The actual length and the specific nature of the attorney/client relationship;
and

7.

Whether the requested attorney's fee is either fixed or contingent.

See generally, John J. Cabrera v. Ralphine Cottrell 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) (condemning
a fee determination made without the proper consideration of the Rules of Professional
Conduct); Govert Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990).
These seven (7) factors were addressed in both of the Plaintiffs attorney's fee affidavits filed
in this case. (Record pp. 467 to 479; Addendum No. 6, p. 38, ^|23; Supplemental Affidavit;
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No.12; Addendum No. 7, p. 38, ^|23).
The Trial Court failed to use or even reference these guidelines in its Findings of Fact.
(Record pp. 560 to 565; Addendum No. 3, pp. 7 to 12). This is clear error of law. The
Findings of Fact entered by the court (and prepared by the Defendant) acknowledges
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reasonable attorney's fees of $27,576.00. The Court then proceeds to divide them up
between the three (3) cause of actions contained in the Complaint without making specific
subsidiary Findings of Fact sufficient to support the reduction in the fee claim or to divide
the claim on account of the cause of actions set forth in the Complaint. (Findings of Fact
1fif20A, 20B, and 20C; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
When attorney fees are factually disputed, then the Trial Court is obligated to make
specific Findings of Fact supporting the reasonableness of the fee award. Graco Fishing v.
Ironwood Exploration 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988): Wendell E. Taylor v. The Estate of Grant
Taylor 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989); Kip Ouinn v. Fenton Ouinn 830 P.2d282 (Utah App.
1992). Failure to make proper Findings of Fact is a reversible error unless the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment entered. Russell Acton v. J.B. Deliran 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). The Findings
of Fact must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
by which the Trial Court's decision was reached. Kim Woodward v. Richard C. Fazzio 823
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991); Kip Ouinn v. Fenton Ouinn 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992).
An attorney fee award will be reversed when the basis for reducing the amount sought
in an unchallenged fee request was not adequately explained in the court's Findings of Fact
or the trial record. Stephen Martindale v. Tom Adams 777 P.2d 514 (Utah App. 1989).
More importantly, unless the record clearly and uncontrovertably supports the Trial
Court's decision, the absence of adequate Findings of Fact precludes appellate review of the
evidentiary basis for the Trial Court's decision and requires a remand for more detailed
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findings by the Trial Court which address the factors that are necessary for an award. Kim
Woodward v. Richard C. Fazzio 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991): State of Utah v. Robert D.
Lovegren 798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990). Where a case has been remanded to the Trial
Court for more detailed Findings of Fact, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a remand
is not to be "merely an exercise in bolstering and support the conclusions already reached".
John F. Allred v. Gavdi S. Allred 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1990). The Trial Court must identify
the various factors and the factual basis for the award and make the appropriate
computations, evaluations, and any required factual or legal determinations.
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are insufficient to support the reduced judgment
entered in this case. The Trial Court initially concluded that reasonable fees were proven by
the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,576.00. (Findings of Fact ^|20A; Record p. 567; Addendum
No. 3, p. 10). However, the final ruling is legally deficient because it fails to identify
specific and proper reasons for reducing the proven claim by two-thirds (%).. The Trial Court
reduced the award despite the fact that all legal costs relating solely to the other two (2) cause
of actions were backed out of the claim. (Trial Transcript pp. 50 to 51; Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 8; Addendum No. 15, p.86). A mere division of fees by category or by cause of
action in the Complaint is not the proper procedure for awarding legal fees as a matter of law.
(Trial Transcript p. 118). A categorical reduction in otherwise proven attorney's fees by
cause of action is erroneous as a matter of law.
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An Award of Attorney's Fees is Based
Upon Various Factors which the Trial
Court Must Consider and Rule Upon.
The Trial Court must thoughtfully evaluate the claim for attorney's fees and the
evidence provided in support thereof. The Trial Court must also take into account the
concessions made at trial. (Trial Transcript p. 49). The Trial Court can come to the
conclusion that a lessor amount is a reasonable under the facts and circumstances of a given
case. Dixie State Bank v. Kirk Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). However, in making that
determination, the Trial Court must consider the following important and well recognized
factors:
1.

The actual difficulty of the litigation and the nature of the case.

2.

The efficiency of the attorney and his staff in presenting the case.

3.

The reasonableness of the specific hours that were spent on the case.

4.

The fees customarily charged in the area and the locality in which the legal
services were rendered.

5.

The dollar amount involved in the case and the results obtained.

6.

The expertise and the actual experience of the various attorneys involved in the
case.

7.

The necessity of bringing the suit in order to vindicate the rights of the
litigants.

8.

The responsibility the case imposed upon the attorney.

9.

The actual fee agreement between the attorney and the his client.

10.

Any other important facts bearing on the nature and the extent of the legal
representation that is required under the facts and circumstances of the case.
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These foregoing factors have been reviewed and accepted by several reviewing courts.
John J. Cabrera v. Ralphine Cottrell 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985): Herbert O. Travnor v. Robert
Cushing 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); Keith C. Wallace v. Build, Inc. 402 P.2d 699 (Utah
1965); Deiavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355,993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.);
Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul Jewkes 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984); Jensen
v. Lichtenstein 45 Ut. 320, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1914).
Where the amount of the award is contested by significant evidence, the Trial Court
must make detailed Findings of Fact in order to support the award of attorney fees. Regional
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W. Reichert 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989); Lynda Baldwin
v. Max D. Burton 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993).
As a general rule, the testimony of the attorney who performed the work is the prime
source of evidence to substantiate the claim and his testimony must be received and
considered by the court. Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul Jewkes 701 P.2d
486 (Utah 1984).
At the time of the trial, the Defendant failed to introduce any competing factual
evidence relating to the important factors cited above. The Defendant's defenses to the
attorney's fee claim are as follows: (i) the fees are not recoverable as a matter of law, (Trial
Transcript p. 7); (ii) the fees were the result of the "churning" of the file, (Trial Transcript
p. 109); (iii) since no actual damages were proven then fees cannot be recovered as a matter
of law, (Trial Transcript p. 108); (iv) some of the issues (i.e. the Lis Pendens filing) were
already being considered by the California Superior Court as part of the domestic law dispute
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and therefore the statutory proceedings in the State of Utah were either meaningless and
legally unnecessary, (Trial Transcript pp. 108 to 109); (v) the Plaintiffs motion to impose
statutory liability was not needed or was procedurally improper, (Trial Transcript p. 109);
and (vi) the Plaintiff was simply chasing an insurance policy. This last allegation is made
even though there is no prior reference in the record of such a claim being made on any
professional liability policy. (Trial Transcript pp. 109 to 110).
Each of the cited factors will be addressed in this brief and was made part of the
Plaintiff s fee claim at the time of the trial.
The Actual Difficulty of the Litigation and the Nature
of the Entire Case is a Factor in Setting a Fee Claim.
The present case represents a statutory cause of action. It was the principle claim
being made by the Plaintiff. (Trial Transcript pp. 57, 74 to 75, 78 to 79; Record pp. 1 to 17;
Addendum No. 4, pp. 13 to 29; Record pp. 472 to 473; Addendum No. 6, pp. 39 to 40, fflf30
and 31; Supplemental Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, pp. 6 to
7).
The present case was made more difficult and time consuming in part by the initial
ruling made by the District Court in not imposing statutory liability and then dismissing the
entire case. This meant that an appeal was essential or the prior ruling of the District Court
would stand. There are other items that have made the case more difficult than originally
contemplated. They are as follows:
1.

Failure to quickly release the Lis Pendens prior to the suit being filed. This
delay lasted over a period of many months despite the repeated written
requests for prompt action to remove the filing.
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2.

The failure to offer the statutory minimum penalty amount of $ 1,000.00.

3.

The claim that the present proceeding was not legally necessary because the
Lis Pendens matters was also before the Superior Court in California as part
of the domestic law proceedings. [This mootness issue was raised in the prior
appeal and was resolved in favor of the Plaintiff. David Winters v. Joanne
Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218, Tfl 1 (Utah App.).]

4.

The continued claim that no attorney's fees are recoverable as a matter of law
and fact. This claim is still being made by the Defendant despite the prior
ruling of the Court of Appeals.

5.

The claim that the California Superior Court had already decided the major
issues in this case.

6.

The raising of collateral attack issues in the docketing statement which had
already been ruled upon by the Court of Appeals.

When the Lis Pendens was not timely removed, a statutory cause of action ripened.
Whether the California Superior Court granted (or denied) any or all of the relief that was
also being sought by the Plaintiff in the Utah suit would not change this fact.

(Trial

Transcript pp. 65, 82 to 83, 86). This is the exact holding of the Court of Appeals in the prior
appeal. David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218, | 1 1
(Utah App.).

-rr

The Efficiency of the Attorney
and His Staff in Presenting the Case.
The Plaintiffs Utah attorney had only two (2) basic goals. The first goal was to get

the recorded Lis Pendens released. The second goal was to assert the claim for damages
either actual or statutory. (Trial Transcript pp. 52 to 55, 65; Record pp. 51 to 54). The
Plaintiffs attorney has been required to pursue an appeal and ultimately prevailed on the
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initial claim that statutory liability existed. (Record p. 563, Addendum No. 3, p. 10). The
Plaintiffs original Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under Rules 12, 54, 55, and 56 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure was directed at this issue. (Trial Transcript pp. 56 to 57; Record
pp. 51 to 54; Addendum No. 5, pp. 30 to 33). The Plaintiff would not have pursued the other
claims and was willing to discard them, if the statutory relief was conceded in the case.
(Trial Transcript pp. 56 to 57, 78 to 79). It is clear that the Plaintiffs objective was to
achieve his two (2) goals as quickly as possible and at the least cost to aU concerned.
There is no evidence in the trial record to support the claim of "churning". (Trial
Transcript p. 109). The vast majority of the legal work that was done was rendered by W.
Kevin Jackson. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 9; Record pp. 467 to 479; Addendum No. 6,
pp. 34 to 46; Supplemental Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, pp.
47 to 58). Despite a lengthy cross-examination, there was no proof of file "churning" as
asserted by the Defendant. (Trial Transcript pp. 58 to 86). The Plaintiffs actions in seeking
the release of the naked Lis Pendens in both courts is not the "churning" of the file.
The generalized defense of unreasonableness is not supported by specific evidence
in the record or any written Findings of Fact. (Record pp. 560 to 563; Addendum No. 3, pp.
7 to 12). There is no proof that the attorney did not efficiently handle the case or that specific
work on a specific day was not necessary or was performed incorrectly.
The Reasonableness of the Specific Hours Spent
in the Prosecution or the Defense of the Case.
There is no evidence in the record that indicates that the actual time that was spent on
any specific matters was unreasonable. (Trial Transcript p. 49). The attorney was crossDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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examined extensively over the legal work that was rendered in this case. (Trial Transcript
pp. 58 to 86). The only error detected on the monthly billing statements was a very modest
time charged that was a proper charge to another client. However, this data entry error was
a nine (9) minutes, (.15) time charge. This erroneous time charge has already been backed
out of the fee claim as part of Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 8. (Trial Transcript p. 83;
Addendum No. 15, pp. 79 to 85).
The Fees Customarily Charged in the Area
in Which the Legal Service is Rendered.
The Affidavit of W. Kevin Jackson details out the factors that were used in arriving
at the hourly rate to be charged in this case. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 9; Record pp. 467
to 479). The Defendant conceded that there is no dispute as to the content of the Affidavit.
(Trial Transcript p. 49, lines 4 to 19). The Affidavit is not contested by other specific
evidence that the rates charged and specific legal services rendered by both the attorney and
his staff are not similar to those charged or those performed in Salt Lake County in cases
such as this. The Court found the hourly rates to be reasonable. (Trial Transcript p. 118).
The fact that the other party (on an overall basis) has incurred legal fees of $14,290.00
is not meaningful evidence that the claimant's fees are in fact unreasonable. (Trial Transcript
p. 98). If there were some specific details that were placed into evidence relating to the
i

Defendant's legal fees and costs, then those fees may have some significance when they are
compared in gross terms. However, the mere comparison of overall or gross fees is not really
meaningful evidence in cases such as this.
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In Contested Proceedings, the Dollar Amount
of the Principle Claim is Not a Significant Factor
in Fixing an Award of Attorney's Fees.
The District Court reduced the fee claim in light of the fact that it was awarding only
$1,000.00 in statutory damages. (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 119). This is erroneous as a
matter of law. This also fails to take into account the remedial nature of the statute.
The courts have generally held that the amount of money in dispute is a factor for the
court to consider, but such is only a marginal factor in many types of cases. Dixie State Bank
v. Kirk Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); First General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d
480 (Utah App. 1996) (the amount of attorney's fees claimed was $52,522.53 and the
principle amount of the claim was only $10,658.47).
In the First General Services case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Trial Court
placed too much importance on the principle amount of the claim as a reason for reducing
the amount of the attorney's fee award. The Trial Court's ruling was then reversed by the
Court of Appeals. In reversing the ruling, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that it ". . .
takes about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to
collection a note for $ 100,000". First General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah
App. 1996); Dixie State Bank v. Kirk Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
The dollar value of this case is a marginal factor in setting the amount of attorney's
fees. The present case arose out of a remedial statute which should be liberally applied. The
party who has been wronged should be made whole. The statute provides a simple way to
avoid all liability and all legal fees if prompt corrective actions are taken. Since the
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Defendant chose to litigate damage amounts that she knew were incurred and liable for, then
she cannot thereafter be heard to complain over the additional fees that are incurred. (Trial
Transcript p. 108, p. 112, line 5).
The Lis Pendens was a "naked" filing only. There was no ongoing dispute over a
claim to the legal title to the Utah home or a claim to the physical possession of the home.
David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App.).
The Plaintiff waited several months for the Lis Pendens to be removed voluntarily before
even filing the suit. (Trial Transcript pp. 53 to 57). The Lis Pendens was released nine (9)
months after the first written request was made.
The Utah suit became the vehicle that eventually vindicated the Plaintiffs right to
have the fee title to the home unencumbered. (Trial Transcript p. 61). The Trust Deed given
to the Defendant Abizaid only acknowledged the existence of a monetary lien claim. The
Trust Deed does not call into question his ownership of the asset. The Court of Appeals has
already ruled that the "replacement" deed does not alter or compromise the statutory cause
of action. David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218, Ifl 1
(Utah App.)
In this case, there was no evidence submitted that the specific work rendered on a
given day was either unwarranted or took too long to accomplish. There is no evidence that
the work was "sloppy" or was repeated again and again by staff personnel in order to run-up
costs. To the contrary, the entire proceeding and each stage of the case was reluctantly
pursued and only after an ample amount of time was given to the Defendant to correct the
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matter. (Trial Transcript pp. 53 to 55, and 65).
The District Court found that the amount necessary to recover the statutory damage
amount of $1,000.00 was limited to $2,000.00. (Trial Transcript p. 116). The court gives
no specific and appropriate reason in its findings to support this ultimate conclusion to award
only limited fees. (Trial Transcript p. 115 to 119).
The District Court found that the amount of fees necessary for the release of the Lis
Pendens was $3,500.00. (Trial Transcript p. 116). No where in its Findings of Fact does it
show how the attorney's fees, incurred in the first appeal, were not necessarily incurred, were
not justified, or were excessive in any way. (Trial Transcript p. 116). In fact, the appeal was
absolutely necessary in order to obtain a ruling on the issue of statutory liability. The
Defendant conceded at trial the nature and the amount of the work that was provided in this
case. (Trial Transcript p. 49). In light of this concession, the award of only limited fees
pursuant to a remedial statute was erroneous as a matter of law.
The Necessity of the Suit to Vindicate Legal Rights
is a Factor in Setting a Fee Claim.
The present civil action was necessary in order to vindicate the Plaintiffs legal rights
to the quiet enjoyment of his real property and to clear record title to the home. (Trial
Transcript pp. 57 to 58). When the Lis Pendens was originally filed, there was no underlying
action pending to support it. At a later date, in the State of California, a post-divorce
domestic action was instituted, but it represented a monetary claim only and it did not make
a specific claim to the title or the physical possession of the Salt Lake County home. (Trial
Transcript pp. 53 to 55). These historical facts are acknowledged in the prior ruling of the
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Court of Appeals. David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d
1218 (Utah App.).
The Plaintiffs Motion to impose statutory liability (i.e. Partial Summary Judgment)
was filed, but denied by the District Court. (Record pp. 51 to 54,392 to 394; Addendum No.
5, pp. 30 to 33). An appeal was pursued by the Plaintiff and liability eventually determined.
The entire suit was necessary in order to clear title to the home and to recover damages and
statutory damages at the very least. The ultimate rulings of the California Superior Court
would not and could not alter the statutory cause of action after the twenty (20) day period
had run. David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah
App.).
The Plaintiff did not file this suit in the Third District Court on the 21 st day after legal
notice of the potential accrual of the claim was given to the Defendant. (Trial Transcript p.
54; Record pp. 1 to 17; Addendum No. 4, pp. 13 to 29). In fact, several months went by
before the suit was filed. Even after the suit was filed, it was hoped that the Defendant would
concede liability and bring the case to an early conclusion. (Trial Transcript pp. 54 to 55).
This never happened. The prosecution of the suit to a conclusion became inevitable even
though it was conceded by the Defendant that: (i) statutory damages was recoverable (Trial
Transcript p. 108, line 5); and (ii) attorney's fees of at least $1,650.00 was recoverable (Trial
Transcript p. 112).
The Responsibility of the Case which Imposed
Upon the Lawyer is a Factor in Setting a Fee Claim.
The present case has lasted for nearly five (5) years. There is no dispute that this has
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been a significantly contested case. This has meant that the attorney has had to decline other
cases and other matters postponed. (Attorney's Fee Affidavit ^|26; Record p. 472; Addendum
No. 6, p. 36; Supplemental Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12, f 16; Addendum No.
7, p. 52).
The case has been appealed twice. The case has been handled primarily by W. Kevin
Jackson. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to 50). The entire responsibility for the case has been left
with W. Kevin Jackson and those under his direct supervision.
There has been no "churning" of the file or duplicated legal costs. No evidence exists
in the record to support a claim of "churning" of the file in order to run up costs. The court
made no such Findings of Fact either orally or in writing. (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 119).
The Fee Agreement of the Client and the Attorney
is a Factor in Setting a Fee Claim.
The present case was prosecuted after a signed fee agreement was entered into. (Trial
Transcript pp. 6 and 7; Attorney's Fee Affidavit % 16; Recordp. 470; AddendumNo. 6, p. 37;
Supplemental Affidavit % Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, p. 15). The fee
agreement sets forth the cost for the representation. The fees sought to be recovered are
based on this agreement and reflects the actual amounts billed to the client on a monthly
basis. (Trial Transcript pp. 7, 8, and 49; Attorney's Fee Affidavit ^fl6 and 22; Record pp.
470 and 471; Addendum No. 6, pp. 37 to 38; Supplemental Affidavit fll6 to 22; Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, pp. 50 to 51).
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Attorney's Fees Can Be Recovered for the Suit
or Defense of a Claim Even if There are Multiple
Claims Some of Which do not Allow the Recovery
of Attorney's Fees.
The District Court limited fees to a very modest sum for several reasons. (Trial
Transcript pp. 116 to 119). First, the statutory damage claim was "complicated" because of
the assertion of the other common law claims. No specific or adequate findings were made
on how this actually impacted the statutory cause of action in a significant way as far as
attorney's fees are concerned. However, this conclusion of the court indirectly recognizes
that the three (3) cause of actions were based upon the same core set of facts. Second, the
cost of the first appeal was limited to $2,500.00. (Trial Transcript p. 116). Here again, no
specific subsidiary facts were shown that support this ultimate legal conclusion. The
Defendant did not put on any evidence that can be construed to prove the fees incurred as a
result of the appeal were unwarranted or unnecessary. (Trial Transcript p. 49). There is no
evidence in the record that shows how the Trial Court arrived at this specific dollar figure.
The District Court specifically declared that the attorney's fees claim is properly
computed by reference to "cause of actions plead". (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 119). Since
there were three (3) cause of actions, the Trial Court simply concluded that the fee award
must be reduced by two-thirds (%). (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 119). This was a specific
"discount" of the fees by reference to the cause of action plead. (Findings of Fact ^[21;
Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10). The District Court, rather than enter specific
Findings of Fact based upon the found evidence, simply chose to divide the fees between the
cause of faction. This is erroneous as a matter of law.
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Reasonable attorney's fees should be awarded to a successful party even though
multiple claims are asserted, provided the claims arise out of the same core set of facts gr
involve related legal theories. Dejavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355,993
P.2d 222 (Utah App.). In order for this rule of law to apply, the claimant must have prevailed
over some portion of the case. Dejavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355,
993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); First General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App.
1996) (holding that the claims were of necessity intertwined, because they arose out of the
same core facts). This same rule of law has also been applied in the federal courts. Stewart
v. Donees 979 F.2d 179 (CA-10 1992); Durant v. Independent School District 990 F.2d 560
(CA-10 1993).
The fact that a party does not succeed in every aspect of the case does not mean the
right to attorney's fees has been lost or should be minimized by the Trial Court. Dejavue Inc.
v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); Leon Sprouse v.
Arien W. Jager 806 P.2d 219 (Utah App. 1991); Robert Kurth v. Daniel R. Wiarda 1999
Utah Ct. App. 153, 981 P.2d 417 (Utah App.).
Where the claims and defenses are intertwined and arise out of the same core set of
facts, then all fees relating to this aspect of the case are recoverable by the prevailing party.
Leon Sprouse v. Arien W. Jager 806 P.2d 219 (Utah App. 1991); Deiavue Inc. v. US Energy
Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); Bovd J. Brown v. David K.
Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109,978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.); Robert Kurth v. Daniel R.
Wiarda 1999 Utah Ct. App. 153, 981 P.2d 417 (Utah App.) (awarding legal fees and noting
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the facts relating to the various claims were closely related). The District Court recognized
that the claims "overlap". (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 117). The claims that were asserted,
as a matter of law, relate to the very same wrongful conduct or activities. (Trial Transcript
pp. 50 to 52; Record p. 473; Addendum No. 6, pp. 34 to 46; Supplemental Affidavit;
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, pp. 47 to 58).
As a general rule, the attorney in seeking his or her claimed fees, must make an
allocation between compensable and noncompensable claims. Cottonwood Mall Co. v.
Wesley F. Sine 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992); Bovd J. Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999
Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.) (court noting the attorney had eliminated all
fees that were not compensable or recoverable).
In making the required allocation between recoverable and nonrecoverable fees,
where proof of specific acts or events in the case cover both compensable and
noncompensable claims, then the courts have allowed the full recovery. The reason for this
r*

is that required proof necessarily overlap and relate to each other. Boyd J. Brown v. David
K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.); First General Service
v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996) (noting that the claims and the asserted
defenses are established by the same core facts). This allocation between compensable and
noncompenable amounts occurred in the present case. (Trial Transcript pp. 49 to 52;
Plaintiff s Trial Exhibit No. 8; Addendum No. 15, p. 86).
In this case, the only matter significantly advanced by the Plaintiff was the statutory
cause of action. (Trial Transcript pp. 50 to 55). The Plaintiff never did seek any type of
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ruling in the District Court on the nonstatutory cause of actions. (Trial Transcript p. 57;
Record pp. 51 to 54; Addendum No. 5, pp. 30 to 33). The Plaintiffs initial Motion to the
Trial Court was only to establish liability under the statutory cause of action.

(Trial

Transcript p. 57; Record pp. 51 to 54; Addendum No. 5, pp. 30 to 33). The statutory claim,
if granted, would have provided adequate relief to the Plaintiff in this case. This is why the
Plaintiff offered to dismiss the remaining common law claims if the statutory relief was
granted by the Trial Court. (Trial Transcript p. 57; Record p. 473, Tf35; Addendum No. 6,
p. 40,1}35; Supplemental Affidavit; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12; Addendum No. 7, p. 53,
f34). The District Court did not grant such relief and dismissed the entire complaint. This
meant an appeal would not only be necessary, but absolutely required in order to vindicate
the Plaintiffs rights regarding the filing of the "naked" Lis Pendens and recover damages.
The other two (2) cause of actions were taken on appeal, but were not reversed.
However, even a cursory reading of the Complaint indicates that they arise out of the same
core facts and present related legal theories based upon the filing of a naked Lis Pendens.
Whether or not the acts complained of support related legal theories, is an issue of law. First
General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996). The District Court's
ruling on this issue is erroneous as a matter of law.
Since the Defendant never offered or tendered any amount of damages under the
remedial statute (even the minimum statutory amount of $1,000.00), the Plaintiff had no
alternative, but to proceed forward and try to recover them through legal proceedings. (Trial
Transcript pp. 62 to 63). The Defendant could have reduced this potential claim (via. an
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offer of a money judgment) pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, this offer was never tendered by the Plaintiff even though the Defendant knew, and
even conceded, that certain damages were recoverable in the present case. (Trial Transcript
pp. 57 to 58, and 108, line 5). The litigation and the appeals, became legally and factually
necessary in order to vindicate legal rights and to recover the statutory minimum amount of
damages at the very least. (Trial Transcript pp. 62 to 65).
A Party Can Recover Attorney's Fee
in Asserting the Claim for Attorney's Fees
or for the Successful Defense to a Claim to
Reduce or Eliminate the Claim for Attorney's Fees.
Where there is a contract provision for an award of attorney's fees, these types of
provisions have been liberally construed to allow a party who successfully defended against
such claims or who has prevailed on asserting such a claim to recover the necessary
attorney's fee relating to the same. Dejavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App.
355, 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Daniel S.
Mehr 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990); ProMax Development v. Rick F. Raile 386 Utah
Adv.Rep. 27 (Utah 1999) (awarding fees on appeal in defending a prior award of attorney's
fees). This same rule of law should apply and does apply in this case even though this case
arises out of a statutory cause of action. The claim for attorney's fees reimbursement arises
out of a remedial statute. It should be liberally applied in this case. The Defendant knew
there were damages of at least the statutory minimum of $ 1,000.00. Rather than concede this
small amount, a trial was demanded. (Trial Transcript p. 108).
Where a party must defend or overcome various matters in order to recover on their
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claim on which an award of attorney's fees is based, then those costs and additional
attorney's fees can also be recovered as part of the claim for attorney's fees. First General
Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996) (dealing with a successful defense
to claim that would have defeated the lien claim on which the award of attorney's fees was
based). This important rule of law was pointed out to the Trial Court and was a central part
of the Plaintiffs claim at the time of the trial on damages and attorney's fees. (Trial
Transcript p. 51).
In this case, the Plaintiff has had to overcome a number of barriers in order to
vindicate his rights and assert (at the very least) his statutory damage claim. (Trial Transcript
pp. 64 to 65, 108, and 112). These barriers have included at least the following:
1.

The initial dismissal of the Complaint by the Trial Court.

2.

The appeal of the denial of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
imposing liability in order to establish the Defendant's statutory liability.

3.

The claim asserted in the District Trial Court that no attorney's fees can be
recovered in the present case because it was the California Superior Court that
eventually ordered a release of the Lis Pendens. (Trial Transcript p. 7).

4.

The claim that the cause of actions are factually independent of each other
even though the claims arise out of the same core set of facts.

5.

The preservation of the fee claim at the trial and again by reason of the
asserted cross-appeal asserting a collateral attack as to statutory liability.

The Plaintiffs evidence proves that all of the fees that were charged are recoverable
except for the sum of $3,421.25. (Trial Transcript p. 51; Plaintiff Trial Exhibit No. 8;
Addendum No. 18, p. 86). The Trial Court should have awarded fees of $32,149.00 or at
least the amount initially found to be reasonable in the sum of $27,576.00. (Findings of Fact
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1J20A; Record p. 563; Addendum No. 3, p. 10).
The Award of Attorney Fees can Include
the Fees Incurred on a Successful Appeal.
The general rule is that where a party is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney fees,
then the recovery should also include any appeal fees and costs absent a contractual or
statutory denial of the same. H. LeRov Cobabe v. B. Glen Crawford 780 P.2d 834 (Utah
App. 1989): Ronald P. Jenkins v. Ronald L. Bailev 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984): G.G.A.. Inc.
v. Toula K. Leventis 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989); Boyd J. Brown v. David K. Richards
840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992); Bovd J. Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct.
App. 109,978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.) (awarding fees on appeal in prior action); Robert Kurth
v. Daniel R. Wiarda 1999 Utah Ct. App. 153, 981 P.2d 417 (Utah App.).
The Plaintiff is entitled to recover the cost of legal representation incurred in the first
appeal. Such was necessary in order to establish the statutory claim and obtain a reversal of
the Trial Court's initial dismissal of the Complaint.
The District Court award of only $2,500.00 for the prosecution of the appeal is not
supported by any subsidiary facts sufficient to justify a substantial reduction from the
original amount claimed. More importantly, the Defendant never offered specific evidence
to limit those fees to this small figure. To the contrary, the Defendant conceded that the
nature of the work rendered and the amount of time spent on the case. (Trial Transcript p.
49). The court specifically found the hourly rate to be reasonable. (Trial Transcript p. 118).
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Where the Amount of Fees are Uncontested by
Specific Evidence, then the Full Amount
Claimed Should be Awarded Absent Specific
Findings Supporting and Justifying the Reduction
in the Total Amount Claimed.
Where the fee claim is supported by admissible and competent evidence and where

is not materially contested by an opposing party by specific evidence, then the Trial Court
must make specific findings in order to justify reducing the amount of the attorney's fee
claim. First General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996); Govert
Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990) (noting that the Trial
Court must make specific Findings of Fact in order to reduce the total fee claim); Boyd J.
Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.).
The specific reasons for the reduction in fees must in fact exist, they must be
articulated by the Trial Court, and more importantly, they must be appropriate under the facts
and the circumstances of the case. If specific facts are not present to justify the reduction in
the amount of the fees, then the Trial Court has abused its discretion in the matter. Boyd J.
Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.). The
only reasoning given by the court for the reduction in the fee claim is in its oral Findings of
Fact. (Trial Transcript pp. 116 to 119). As a matter of law, these stated reasons are
insufficient in this case.
The present case represents a statutory cause of action for failure to timely release an
improperly filed document that clouds a person's title to his real property. The Defendant
claims that all attorney's fees should be denied because the Lis Pendens was removed by an
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Order of the California Superior Court. (Trial Transcript p. 7). This mootness issue was
raised and resolved against the Defendant in the prior appeal. David Winters v. Joanne
Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218, f 11 (Utah App.).
The eventual clearing of the title (however obtained) is only part of the relief the
Plaintiff is entitled to. (Trial Transcript pp. 64 to 65). It is an important part of his case.
However, it is also clear that the California Superior Court could not and did not adjudicate
the statutory cause of action in any way or address the Plaintiffs attorney's fees relating to
the statutory claim. The Defendant conceded that certain damage items and legal fees were
recoverable, but failed to offer the same and chose to have the claims litigated. (Trial
Transcript pp. 108 and 112). In truth, it was the Defendant who chose to run-up the legal
costs in this case.
An Award of Fees can Include
Paralegal Fees and Legal Assistant.
r

A Trial Court can include in an attorney's fee award the fees charged for paralegals

and legal assistants. The Utah supreme Court has authorized such fees to be recoverable.
Lvnda Baldwin v. Max D. Burton 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993); See also Continental
Townhouses v. Rov R. Brockbank 733 P.2d 1120 (Ariz. App. 1986).
£r

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the use of such professional are beneficial to

society by reducing costs, promotes lawyer efficiency and has at the very least become a
wide spread industry practice. Lvnda Baldwin v. MaxD. Burton 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993).
The same rule of law and public policy considerations would apply as to law clerks
and other para-professionals who assist the attorney in the case. There was no competing
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evidence that the work done in this case by the paralegal or legal assistant was unnecessary
or useless. (Trial Transcript p. 49). Therefore, the full amount should have been allowed by
the District Court for these types of services.
Standard on Appeal for Reviewing
an Award of Attorney Fees.
In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the Appeals Court will presume that the
discretion of the Trial Court is properly exercised unless the record clearly indicates the
contrary. Beverly Goddard v. Grant A. Hickman 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984); Thomas J.
Donnahue v. Intermountain Health Care 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1988).
Generally, a Trial Court will be deemed to have abused its discretion where it awards
less than the amount of attorney fees requested when there is an adequate and uncontroverted
evidence in the record to support the actual fees claimed, unless the Trial Court specifically
offers an explanation for the reduction in the fee while addressing and considering the
important factors used in setting fee claims. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W.
Reichert 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989); Stephen Martindale v. Tom Adams 777 P.2d 514
(Utah App. 1989); Dixie State Bank v. Kirk Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's judgment relating to damages, statutory prejudgment interest, and
recoverable attorney's fees is erroneous. The court misapplied the law to the established
facts of the case. The court failed to treble proven damages. The court failed to compute the
amount of attorney's fees in accordance with the law and then improperly reduced the claim
by two-thirds (%). The District Court should have awarded the full amount of the legal fees
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claimed, but not less than the amount found to be reasonable in the sum of $27,576.00.
This party requests oral argument of the appeal.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of August, 2000.

W. KEVpNj JACKS
Attorney at Law
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